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We consider two aspects of the human enterprise that profoundly affect the global environment: population
and consumption. We show that fertility and consumption behavior harbor a class of externalities that have not
been much noted in the literature. Both are driven in part by attitudes and preferences that are not egoistic
but socially embedded; that is, each household’s decisions are influenced by the decisions made by others. In a
famous paper, Garrett Hardin [G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243–1248 (1968)] drew attention to overpopulation
and concluded that the solution lay in people “abandoning the freedom to breed.” That human attitudes and
practices are socially embedded suggests that it is possible for people to reduce their fertility rates and
consumption demands without experiencing a loss in wellbeing. We focus on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa
and consumption in the rich world and argue that bottom-up social mechanisms rather than top-down gov-
ernment interventions are better placed to bring about those ecologically desirable changes.
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The biosphere is the part of Earth that is occupied by
living organisms. A useful way to partition it is in terms
of interconnected constituents we call ecosystems.
Ecosystems combine the abiotic environment with bi-
ological communities (plants, animals, fungi, microor-
ganisms) that form self-regenerative functional units.
They differ in their spatial reach (a hedgehog’s gut is
an ecosystem as is a tropical rain forest) and rhythmic
time (minutes for bacterial colonies; decades for a boreal
forest), but even as an aggregate, the biosphere is a self-
regenerative system. Also, like its constituent parts, the
biosphere is diminished as a stock, in quality or quantity
(or both), when our demand for its goods and services
exceeds its ability to supply them on a sustainable basis.
The Commons as Externalities
Being in large measure a common property resource,
many of the constituent parts of the biosphere are
freely available. Moreover, people everywhere are
capable of recognizing that a commodity is free. Thus,
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if population size relative to the cost of harvesting the biosphere is
large, then other things equal, people draw excessively on it (1).
The “tragedy of the commons” is a widely used metaphor for the
phenomenon (2). Those excessive demands reflect the desires of
individual households to convert the biosphere into their own pri-
vate sources at rates that are higher than the rates they would
choose were households to be guided by their collective interest.
One expression of that excess is the difference between the dis-
count rates of time that are inferred from our market transactions
and the rates people would choose to discount the future were we
able to negotiate among ourselves over the demands that wemake
of the biosphere (3). Thus, estimates of discount rates based ex-
clusively on market data (4, 5) mislead: they are biased upward.
Another expression of our excessive demands on the biosphere is
procreation, for freedom in the commons provides people with a
stimulus to reproduce their numbers, other things equal (3). The
stimulus, which may of course be negligible for some communities
depending on their social mores, provides a direct link between the
commons and aggregate population size. No doubt the demands
that each of usmakes of the biosphere are small, but when summed
across all people and over time, they are substantial. The commons
create a social environment that resembles the classic prisoners’
dilemma in game theory.
The excessive demands that we make of the biosphere (which
we will also refer to as nature) are a manifestation of externalities,
which are the unaccounted consequences for others, including
future people, of actions taken by one or more persons. As ex-
ternalities reflect institutional failure (e.g., the failure of nations to
reach agreement on the use of the global commons; the failure of
a community to protect its local natural resource base through
checks and balances; the failure of a society to award equal power
for women and men), the commons can only be rescued by rea-
soned collective action. It has been customary to study ways to
avoid the tragedy of the commons by considering taxes and
regulations at the national level (1), communitarian practices at the
local level (6–8), and treaties at the international level (9).
The underlying assumption about human behavior in many of
those studies has been that people are egoists. Here, we study
ways that are based on social norms that arise when people look
to the decisions made by others when making their own decisions
(10–16). For the purposes of managing the commons, there is thus
a role not only for governments but also, for communities and
civil society.
We use the term socially embedded preferences or “social
preferences” for short to identify someone’s behavior and prac-
tices that are influenced by the behavior of others. Two broad
classes of social preferences have been found to be empirically
significant: competitive and conformist. The former as in the
phenomenon of conspicuous consumption [first studied by the
sociologist Thorsten Veblen (10) and more recently given wide
empirical support in refs. 11 and 12] displays a desire for a high
social status relative to that of others. The latter embodies a desire
to be like others, meaning that a person prefers to be close to
others in their choices rather than be distant from others (13). The
former gives rise to a pressure for higher consumption; the latter
leans toward conformity. Our behaviors in some spheres of life
have been found to be competitive (11, 15); in others, they have
been found to be conformist (13, 16), and in still others, they seem
to resemble those of the egoist, familiar in economics textbooks. We
study the implications of competitive behavior over consumption in
the rich world and conformist behavior over reproduction in the
world’s poorest countries as templates for understanding the
overshoot in demand that humanity has been exercising over the
biosphere’s goods and services in recent decades.
We do not claim that behavior is necessarily based on con-
scious choices. A reviewer has suggested that, in preliterate so-
ciety, behavior was purely norm based and that basic female
education has helped to bring fertility into the calculus of con-
scious choice, with an attendant reduction in fertility desire.
However, conscious choice even in modern societies does not
preclude the influence of social norms (17). More importantly for
fertility surveys, women selling goods in the marketplace in the
poorest countries may be illiterate but are never innumerate. We
will make use of the distinction subsequently.
Behavior directed by social preferences has externalities built
into it. Here, we study the biospheric implications of those ex-
ternalities. In contrast to competitive social preferences and to the
problem of the commons, conformist social preferences give rise
to social environments that have the structure of coordination
games, possibly possessing multiple stable equilibria, all parties
being better off in some than in others (14). Although conformist
preferences over reproduction can amplify the tragedy of the
commons, they appear in the literature infrequently, perhaps
because of concerns about state intervention in what are regarded
as personal matters. Social preferences over consumption goods
in contrast are mentioned in the media on occasion, but they have
not yet entered policy discourse, perhaps because they too are
thought to be in the private domain. However, because social
preferences give rise to externalities, behavior responding to
them should not be regarded as purely personal matters.
Moreover, behavior based on such preferences can be shifted by
social mechanisms that do not involve state directives but instead,
bottom-up social mechanisms. The latter are likely to be better
placed to bring about ecologically desirable changes.
In this paper, we present a framework for identifying the factors
that have contributed to humanity’s overshoot in the demand for
the biosphere’s goods and services. We then apply the notion of
social preferences to the framework to argue that the social costs
of eliminating the overshoot may prove to be far less than is
currently feared.
The Impact Equation and Unsustainable Development
Population size, living standards, and the technologies and insti-
tutions in play shape humanity’s demand for the biosphere’s
goods and services (18). The composition of the biosphere mat-
ters greatly, but here, we simplify by conceptualizing it as a self-
organizing regenerative resource measured in, say, tons of bio-
mass. The biosphere’s primary productivity is the rate at which it
regenerates itself. As we are measuring the biosphere in units of
biomass, primary productivity is the amount of carbon that is fixed
(net of respiration) by autotrophs per unit of time, which for our
purposes here, amounts to the net rate at which carbon is fixed
from photosynthesis. Primary productivity is the source of energy
for all living matter and is a flow. In contrast, the biosphere is a
stock and is the locus of the products and services that we extract
from it.
Humanity’s impact on the biosphere per unit of time is called
the “global ecological footprint.” To construct a measure of that
impact, let N be human population and y an index of human ac-
tivity per person per unit of time. Estimating average human ac-
tivity per person poses huge measurement problems; therefore,
for tractability, we suppose that it corresponds to the standard
of living as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
The move almost surely yields an underestimate of what we are
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after because there are many human activities that are not cap-
tured in the market value of all final consumption goods and
services in a year. Global GDP is thus a mere proxy for what we are
seeking. On occasion, national income statisticians have offered
estimates of the magnitude of economic transactions that are
missing in GDP, but they are too scanty to be of use here.
Degradation of the biosphere can hasten the depreciation of
other assets (rising sea level submerges coastal infrastructure,
hotter weather lowers labor productivity, and so on). Here, we
focus instead on the demand that we make of the biosphere’s
goods and services. That demand takes two broad forms. We
harvest nature’s goods and use nature’s services for consumption
and production. (Fish, timber, and fresh water constitute goods;
pollination, water purification, flood protection, and sequestration
and storage constitute services.) We also degrade natural capital
stocks through overharvest and through overuse as pollution
sinks. Let X denote harvest demand and Z denote the demand
that we make of the biosphere as a pollution sink. Both are
functions of Ny, and therefore, we may write X = X(Ny) and Z =
Z(Ny). This way of partitioning the global ecological footprint says
that pollution is the reverse of conservation (19).
Let αX be a numerical measure of the efficiency with which the
biosphere’s goods and services are converted into GDP, and let
αZ be a numerical measure of the extent to which we are able to
treat our waste products before discharging them. Therefore, we
have X = Ny/αX and Z = Ny/αZ. Humanity’s demand from the
biosphere in a given year is then (Ny/αX + Ny/αZ). Define α = (αX +
αZ)/αXαZ. Then, (Ny/αX +Ny/αZ) ≡Ny/α is our proxy measure of the
global ecological footprint. If the footprint exceeds the bio-
sphere’s regenerative rate, the stock diminishes. Similarly, if the
footprint is less than the biosphere’s regenerative rate, the stock
increases. (Bifurcations leading to regime shifts and irreversibil-
ities can be incorporated into this analysis.) However, population,
GDP per capita, or both could increase without making additional
demands on the biosphere provided either αX or αZ and thus, α
were to increase correspondingly. Improvements in technology
(e.g., substituting degradable waste for persistent pollutants;
decarbonizing the energy sector) as well as institutions and prac-
tices (e.g., establishing protected areas; reducing food waste) and
appropriate redistributions of wealth are among the means by
which α can be raised.
Let G denote the regenerative rate of the biosphere. G de-
pends on the biosphere’s stock, which we write as S. Thus, G =
G(S). The G function can be affected by policy. The application of
biotechnology in agriculture is one avenue. Another is “ecosystem
engineering.” A recent experiment in American Samoa, for exam-
ple, found that transplanted heat-tolerant corals were more likely to
survive a bleaching event than less tolerant local corals, enabling
quicker recovery of the ecosystem after such an event (20). In the
range of stocks we are concerned with here (stocks below the level
capable of sustaining a maximum yield), dG/dS > 0.
Humanity’s ecological footprint does not have to equal the
biosphere’s regenerative rate because the difference would be
accommodated by a change in the biosphere’s stock S. A world
rich in healthy ecosystems could, on utilitarian grounds, choose to
draw down the biosphere and use the goods and services that it
supplies so as to accumulate produced capital and human capital.
That is what economic development has come to mean among
many thinkers, but the scenario comes in tandem with an over-
shoot in our demands from the biosphere. The overshoot cannot
be maintained indefinitely because our life support system would
be threatened.
In recent decades, Ny/α has exceeded G, thus drawing down
S. Studies of biogeochemical signatures of the past 11,000 y have
tracked the human-induced evolution of soil nitrogen and phos-
phorus in inventories of sediments and ice (21). They have
reported that the hockey stick shape that has been found in time
series of mean global temperature also characterizes many global
biogeochemical signatures over similar timescales: they display a
flat trend over millennia until some 250 y ago followed by a slow
increase until the middle of the 20th century and then, a sharp rise
that continues at a fast rate to this day. We interpret that feature of
the time series as a continual and growing rise in Ny/α. Biological
extinctions, increases in greenhouse gas concentrations, con-
tamination of marine species with persistent pollutants, nutrient
overload in soil and water, and oceanic dead zones are reflections
of the biospheric overload, meaning that S has declined, with the
attendant reduction in G, which in turn, has increased the gap
between Ny/α and G. Because the decline in S would appear to
have been dramatic since the middle of the last century, mid-20th
century has been proposed as the time that we entered the
Anthropocene (21). Crude estimates (22) suggest that the ratio of
Ny/α to G(S) is today 1.7.
Over the years, a large body of work has found that bio-
diversity is a major determinant of the biosphere’s productivity
and its ability to withstand stresses and shocks (22, 23). Alarm-
ingly, current extinction rates of species in various orders appear
to be 100 to 1,000 times higher than their average rate (about
1 per million species per year) over the past several million years
(24, 25). In the last 40 y, there has been a 60% decline on average
in the populations of mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphib-
ians, mostly in the tropics (26). Biodiversity loss and climate
change are now widely regarded to be the two most significant
global environmental problems that we face today. Moreover,
each influences the other (27). To the extent that they reinforce
one another, policies that curb one can be expected to temper
the other.
These findings are consistent with macroeconomic data (3).
From 1950 to 2019, global GDP per capita increased nearly
fivefold from about 3,500 international dollars (i.e., US $3,500
purchasing power parity) to about 17,000 international dollars in
2011 prices, even as population trebled in size (from ∼2.5 billion
in 1950 to around 7.7 billion in 2019). A nearly 15-fold increase in
global economic activity in 70 y, taking place from a base year
global GDP per capita that was higher than ever before, may give
one hope of a future of perpetual material advancement, but
when the economic data are paired with environmental indicators,
it would appear that the rise in economic activity has been built on
unsustainable foundations. Produced capital and human capital
have no doubt increased by many fold, but as a stock of natural
capital, the biosphere has shrunk considerably.
In the long run, humanity’s ecological footprint must equal the
biosphere’s regenerative rate. That equality represents a sus-
tainable state of affairs. The widely discussed United Nations’
(UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set in 2015 were
formulated on the assumption that they can be attained, but
the background documents did not probe the question whether
the goals are sustainable in a world that simultaneously enjoys
growth in global GDP.
We, therefore, work backward by first identifying a condition
the global economy’s treatment of the biosphere must satisfy if
the SDGs are themselves to be sustainable. That condition points
to ways in which S can be stabilized. To sustain a value of S
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requires that the global ecological footprint equals the bio-
sphere’s regenerative rate: that is,
Ny=αX +Ny=αZ ≡Ny=α=GðSÞ. [1]
Eq. 1, which we call the Impact Equation, applies to the bio-
sphere as a whole. Although the notion of ecological footprint (the
left-hand side of Eq. 1) can be applied to any group of individuals—
from the individual and the household to nations and the global
population—trade in commodities and services breaks the link
between demand (Ny/α) and supply [G(S)] for economic units
smaller than the world as a whole. The ecological footprint of a
nation will not balance the regenerative rate of its ecosystems if its
trade in the biosphere’s goods and services does not balance in
units of biomass. Of course, it could be that a country pays for its
imports, perhaps even at their appropriate prices, but that is a
different matter. Here, we are only formulating a way to break
down the global imbalance of demand and supply of those goods
and services into imbalances among groups in the global pop-
ulation; we are not discussing “fair trade.”
Decoupling the demands that humanity makes on the bio-
sphere Ny/α in the left-hand side of Eq. 1 also serves to remind us
that measures to reduce environmental pollution, Z, can raise our
demand for the biosphere’s products, X = Ny/αX. Solar panels
require minerals such as aluminum, cadmium, and zinc. However,
obtaining those minerals usually requires destroying forests.
The literature on the economics of climate change offers a
convenient illustration of the need to move to a world where the
Impact Equation is reached. Much of that literature has taken Ny
as given under various scenarios or pathways, focusing instead on
mitigation: that is, on raising αZ by decarbonizing the economy
and removing CO2 from the atmosphere. However, the reason
that CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have increased is not
only that mitigation and carbon removal measures have been
slow; it is also that growth in both GDP per capita and population
have been strong. In this paper, we point to ways for reducing Ny
or putting the world onto a more favorable pathway for limiting
climate change.
Why has αZ not risen more? The reason is a low rate of inno-
vation and investment in nonfossil fuel energy sources and carbon
capture and storage technologies. However, these low rates, in
turn, have been caused by a persistent and pervasive institutional
failure: the failure to achieve collective action in limiting climate
change. Despite nearly 30 y of diplomatic effort, the world has
been unable to overturn the tragedy of the climate commons.
The externalities relating to fertility and consumption have other
causes, and they can and should be addressed by other institu-
tions. Doing so will not make up for the failure to address climate
change directly, but it will help to keep equilibrium global mean
temperature closer to the levels advocated for in international
conferences.
The variables on the left-hand side of Eq. 1, however, point to
proximate causes behind the size of our ecological footprint. As
ways to raise αZ have been much discussed in the literature on
climate change, we explore factors that influence future N and
current and future y.
Fertility in Low per Capita Income Settings
There are two prominent global population projections for the
future: one emerging from the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (28) and the other from the UN Population
Division in ongoing work over the past decades (29). There is little
difference in their projections of global population size in 2050,
and both project a larger population in 2100 than population
today. Therefore, our analysis here is unaffected by differences in
the two publications. While the projections in ref. 28 are built
primarily on forecasts of women’s education and other objectives
in the SDGs, including the global standard of living, a multitude of
factors is implicit in the UN projections (30). However, because the
UN projections of alternative future trajectories, cast in probabi-
listic terms, are more widely known, we cite them here.
The UN’s median projection of world population in year 2100
is 10.9 billion, with a 95% certainty range of between 9.4 and
12.7 billion (29). More than three-quarters of the increase from
today’s 7.7 billion is expected to be in sub-Saharan Africa, where
population in 2100 is projected to rise from today’s ∼1.1 billion to
3.8 billion (Fig. 1). Comprising around 14% of the world’s pop-
ulation, the region represents only a bit more than 3% of the world
economy. Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa cannot remotely be held
responsible for the global environmental problems that we face
today. However, attempts to raise incomes there even to the
current global average income (∼17,000 international dollars) in
the face of a near-3 billion rise in numbers will require an increase
in the region’s annual output from 3.5 trillion international dollars
to about 68 trillion international dollars at today’s prices. That rise,
assuming that it is possible, is likely to have adverse conse-
quences for the region’s ecology, contributing to further societal
conflicts there and greater attempted population movements
both within the region and out of it (31).
The SDGs are reticent about population, and yet, it is difficult
to imagine that they can be met without addressing the subject. It
has been argued that the goal to restrict the increase in mean
global temperature to 2 °C from that in the preindustrial revolu-
tion era is unlikely to be met unless population growth is reduced
substantially (31), and yet, even the recent Paris Agreement on
climate change has made nomention of population. Population in
sub-Saharan Africa has risen sharply since the middle of the 20th
century because the substantial reductions in the death rate there
were not matched by reductions in fertility. Today, women in sub-
Saharan Africa have on average around 4.7 births over the course
of a lifetime in contrast to a world average of 2.5. The total fertility
rate in India has fallen to 2.2, while that in China (at 1.7) is well
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Fig. 1. Population, 1950 to 2020; projections 2020 to 2100.
Human population is by region; data are available at https://population.
un.org/wpp/.
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below replacement level (29). Sub-Saharan Africa’s slower fertility
decline has been traced to many reasons, including inheritance
rules, the prevalence of polygamy, lack of access to modern
methods of contraception, low education among women, and
kinship obligations (32–34). Here, we examine a pathway that has
been less discussed but that offers an explanation for why the
desired number of children should have remained substantially
higher in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere. The account of the
pathway combines history with social mechanisms as seen through
the lens of economics.
Fertility practices are not only influenced by private desires and
wants; they are also shaped by societal mores. Anthropologists
have reported that women in sub-Saharan Africa acknowledge that
they are able to acquire social status through reproductive success
(33). This attitude toward reproduction has been called “Children as
wealth” (35).
Using this as a template, we may say that reproductive be-
havior is “conformist” when the family size that a household de-
sires is positively related to the average family size in the community
or more broadly, in the world that households come into contact
with (15). Conformism gives rise to externalities harboring multiple
equilibria. As long as all others aim at large families, no household
will wish to deviate from the practice; if, however, all other house-
holds were to restrict their fertility, every household would wish to
restrict its fertility. A society can thus get embedded in a self-
sustaining mode of behavior characterized by high fertility and
stagnant living standards, even when there is another potentially
self-sustaining mode of behavior that is characterized by low fertility
and rising living standards, which is preferred by all (14, 15). The
structure of social interactions arising from conformist preferences is
known as coordination games.
Conformist preferences are depicted in a stylized form in Fig.
2. The curve ABCDE is a household’s desired number of children
plotted against the average number of children per household
(the horizontal axis) in the community. The curve is upward sloping
and intersects the 45° line from 0 to F at three points (B, C, and D),
each of which is a social equilibrium. B and D are stable, while C is
unstable. In the figure, which is purely illustrative, every household
desires d children if all other households have d children each
and b if each among all others have b. Imagine now that every
household prefers the outcome in which all households have b
children each to the one in which all have d children each. As
having either b or d children is a stable equilibrium, a fertility rate
of d would be just as tenacious as a fertility rate of b.
The theoretical observation that reproductive behavior is
guided by conformist preferences [more particularly, that the
drivers of such behavior can give rise to multiple reproductive
equilibria (14)] was given support in a study of contraceptive use in
rural Kenya, which found that, in communities having dense social
networks and a poorly developed market economy, a woman
would be unlikely to use contraceptive methods if contraception
use in her network was low, whereas she would be likely to use
such methods if contraception use in her network was high (36).
The theory was also given support in an analysis of a natural ex-
periment that found that state-level fertility rates declined in step
following staggered introductions of cable television across In-
dian states in the 1980s (37).
Further support has been provided in a recent analysis of
contraceptive uptake in Bangladesh (38). The study concerned
women living in the same community but belonging to different
religious groups. After controlling for individual differences in
education, age, wealth, and the like, the study found that a
woman’s choice to use contraception depended strongly on the
predominant choice made by other women in her religious group
and was unaffected by the predominant choice made by women
belonging to the other group.
Persistent reproductive practices that go counter to present-
day interests may of course have had a rationale in the past.
However, even when circumstances have changed, a society can
remain stuck in a mode of behavior characterized by high fertility
(d) even when there is an alternative that is characterized by low
fertility (b), which would be preferred by all. This suboptimal sit-
uation disappears when tradition breakers (e.g., more educated
women) lead the way to move toward smaller families. Newspa-
pers, radio, television, and the internet communicate information
about other lifestyles. The media can be a vehicle by which con-
formism becomes based on the behavior of a wider population
than the local community, which disrupts existing practices.
Community discussions on the benefits of smaller family size can
coordinate households to act on lowered fertility targets. Eco-
nomic demographers have interpreted the persistence of high
fertility in sub-Saharan Africa to a strong desire for children (39).
Conformist preferences point to a different interpretation. Be-
havior based on such preferences can be expected to display a
strong positive correlation between fertility desires and fertility
outcomes (as is shown in ref. 39), but causality should not be at-
tributed to the relationship. Conformist preferences tell us that it
would be as true to say that fertility rates in a country are high
because people there have a strong desire for children as it would
be to say that people there have a strong desire to have children
because fertility rates are high (15).
Fortunately, the transition from d to b children per household
does not require coercion, taxation, or even education. A con-
formist behavior can be shifted by changing expectations about
others’ fertility choices. Family planning programs can be so
designed as to encourage members of communities to share in-
formation about modern methods of contraception and discuss
Fig. 2. Conformist preferences for children. The vertical axis shows a
household’s desired number of children; the horizontal axis shows
the average fertility rate in the society to which this household
belongs. The curve from A to E shows the household’s preferences.
The curve from 0 to F shows the 45° line at which the desired number
of children equals the average fertility rate. Points B, C, and D
represent equilibria. Points B and D are stable; point C is unstable.
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the advantages of smaller families. As routes to fertility transition,
investment in community-based family planning programs should
be regarded as essential (40).
By providing access to subsidized contraceptive commodi-
ties and services, family planning programs were successful in
accelerating fertility declines in Asia and Latin America in the
1960s to 1980s. The rationale for vigorously expanding the content
and reach of such programs today lies in the 53 million women in
sub-Saharan Africa who report that they want to stop or delay
childbearing but are not using any modern method of contracep-
tion (41). Some use traditional methods; nevertheless, it should not
be surprising that 43% of the 206million pregnancies in developing
regions in 2017 were unintended: that is, they occurred too soon or
were not wanted at all (42). Many unintended pregnancies end in
abortion, a significant proportion of which are performed under
unsafe conditions.
In addition to reducing unintended pregnancies, contracep-
tive use among women enhances their own health and that of
their children by spacing births and by providing greater oppor-
tunity for education. Yet, family planning is a neglected feature of
contemporary public policy. Currently, only about 0.6% of over-
seas development assistance is awarded to it (43). Moreover,
developing countries relegate family planning expenditures to
minor government departments.
Despite evidence that family planning reduces poverty, the
World Bank has given low priority to family planning. Although the
SDGs include universal access to sexual and reproductive health
and emphasize reproductive rights, the family planning indicator
that is advanced (SDG indicator 3.7.1) is focused on the satisfac-
tion of the individual woman’s expressed desires; it does not value
increases in the demand for family planning by community en-
gagement (15). The introduction of family planning-related media
messages is credited for part of the rise in contraceptive demand
and use in countries where such communication is active. Be-
tween 2000 and 2015, the demand for contraception among
women of reproductive age rose from 32 to 41% in Ethiopia, from
48 to 60% in Malawi, and from 30 to 44% in Rwanda (41). In
contrast, little or no change in demand was observed in countries
such as Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where
family planning programs are weak and continue to be under-
mined by fragile states and conflict. Moreover, the questions that
are directed at women in questionnaires to elicit their fertility
desires continue to be ill-formed: They do not ask women what
their desired fertility would be were the fertility choices of their
peers to change. The acknowledgment that reproductive prefer-
ences are socially embedded should be reflected in the ques-
tionnaires used to identify women’s fertility intentions (15).
Consumption by the Rich Minority
The World Bank (44) has reported that the ∼1.2 billion people on
its list of high-income countries enjoy a per capita GDP of 46,700
international dollars, implying a GDP of 56 trillion international
dollars. World output today is about 120 trillion international
dollars. Assuming that our ecological footprint is proportional to
the scale of economic activity, close to 50% of humanity’s impact
($56 trillion/$120 trillion) on the biosphere can be attributed to
some 16% of world population. That is of course the current state
of affairs. Output growth in the rest of the world can be expected
to make yet further demands on the biosphere. If, as a reasonable
aspiration, per capita income in 2100 were 30,000 international
dollars at today’s prices (a figure close to the average in today’s
middle income countries) global output at a population of 10.9
billion would be 336 trillion international dollars or nearly three
times the current level. The SDGs speak of environmental pro-
tection but would not seem to have been influenced by humanity’s
prospective demands of the biosphere’s goods and services and of
its assimilative capacity. If that demand is to be brought down to
sustainable levels, either global output (Ny) will have to decline
substantially or technological advances and institutional reforms will
have to reduce the environmental impact of high consumption
levels (i.e., α will have to be increased). Above, we have explored
ways in which growth in N could be reduced. However, as the
remedy of reducing y is also typically neglected, we focus on it here.
Consumption behavior is influenced both by our urge to compete
with others (Veblen’s “conspicuous consumption”) and by our innate
desire to conform (fads and fashions are only the most striking ex-
amples). Building on a wealth of sociological data, Bourdieu (11) has
argued that our taste for consumption goods and services is sub-
stantially influenced by the tastes of others in our peer group and
aspirational groups. Here, we follow that line of inquiry and regard
consumption choices as being based on social preferences over a
category of goods if the (positive) benefit to an individual of an ad-
ditional unit of consumption of a commodity in that category in-
creases with the number of people who consume that commodity.
To illustrate how an environmentally pernicious category of
goods can get established, suppose that there are two categories
of consumption goods. Category 1 goods are intensive in the use
of the biosphere, whereas the production of category 2 goods is
intensive in the use of human capital. If the biosphere was freely
accessible, category 1 goods would be cheaper than category 2
goods, other things equal. It is then easy to see why people would
have been drawn to category 1 goods in the past and how that
would have triggered further demands for category 1 goods, thus
fueling an ever-expanding demand for them. Nor would we expect
technological advances to be directed at lessening the production
costs of category 2 goods. Quite the contrary, competing entre-
preneurs would invest in technologies that economize on factor
inputs other than natural capital in the production of category
1 goods. Also, that would further fuel the global demand for cat-
egory 1 goods. Moreover, the greater the difference is between the
(market) costs of production of goods in the two categories, the
bigger would be the social effort required tomove consumers away
from category 1 goods to category 2 goods. Difference between
the two costs structures would be accentuated by the existence of
fixed capital in the sector producing category 1 goods. Retiring
machines and equipment before their intended dates can be costly.
We are experiencing that phenomenon even as nations try to move
away from industries based on fossil fuels.
The current structure of market prices works against our com-
mon future; the biosphere is precious but priced cheaply. To shift
consumption patterns in the rich world and the aspiring con-
sumption patterns of the poor world and those of emerging
economies away from resource-intensive goods and services will
require massive, coordinated actions. In a different context, econ-
omists use the term “big push” to indicate the investment expen-
ditures and collective determination that are required to move an
economy from one equilibrium to another superior one. Fortu-
nately, when social preferences dominate consumption choice, the
psychological cost to a person of a collective reduction in con-
sumption is likely to be a lot less than what it would be if she was to
reduce consumption unilaterally (15). For example, it has been ar-
gued that, as between two societies (one in which everyone owned
a large house and had little time for exercising or socializing and
another in which everyone owned a modest-sized home but had
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more time for these other activities), subjective wellbeing would be
higher in the second society (45). The point made by the author is
that, to the extent that house size is a positional good, people care
more about how much they have relative to others than with the
absolute size of the house that they live in. By limiting house size,
however, resources can be devoted to activities that are known to
increase wellbeing. The argument in ref. 45 extends to shifting
expenditure away from positional goods toward public goods (45),
including a healthier biosphere.
Although competitive impulses create a tragedy of the com-
mons as regards positional goods, conformist preferences can
create a positive feedback leading to a mutually preferred col-
lective outcome. A study in California shows that an additional
installation of solar photovoltaic panels increases the probability
of adoption within the same zip code by 0.8%, with the effect
being particularly strong at the localized street level (46). Infor-
mation campaigns also shape behavior. One US study found that
electricity customers receiving information about their consump-
tion relative to that of their neighbors reduced energy consumption
by 2% (47). Yet another randomized field experiment found that
social comparison lowered water consumption by nearly 5% (48).
That a move to environmentally friendly behavior would be a
gesture toward our descendants is, of course, an added bonus.
Social and Technological Transformations to Resolve
Population and Consumption Dilemmas
In pushing the biosphere deeper into unsustainable territory, the
large and growing scale of the human enterprise as reflected in
both per capita consumption and population poses a threat to
wellbeing worldwide. Improvements in technology and institu-
tions are critical. Conceivably, they can even offset or more than
offset the harmful effects of scale. Indeed, changes in technology
and institutions have successfully transformed some sectors. By
banning chlorofluorocarbons, the Montreal Protocol is expec-
ted to restore stratospheric ozone to its pre-1980 level by mid-
century. Lead has been phased out of petrol worldwide. Much less
oil enters our seas than was the case a few decades ago thanks to
changes in tanker design mandated by international agreements.
In other areas, including biodiversity loss, degradation of crit-
ical ecosystems, and climate change, our collective efforts have
not only been less successful; they have failed. For example,
calculations by the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change show that, even if countries fulfill their Paris
pledges, CO2 emissions will continue to increase through 2030,
virtually guaranteeing that the collective goal of limiting global
mean temperature change to well below 2 °C relative to the pre-
industrial level will be breached. Costs of wind turbines and solar
cells have fallen, but there have also been improvements in fossil
fuel extraction technology (fracking). Decarbonization of the global
energy system is proceeding slowly because institutions like Paris
have failed to avert the tragedy of the climate commons. Use of the
atmosphere as a repository for CO2 continues to be priced low,
even though the social costs of carbon are high.
A solution being considered now is to address climate change
jointly with income inequality in the form of a domestic “green
new deal” (House Resolution 109, 116th US Congress, 2019). The
motivation would seem to be of a political economy nature, but
it is as well to ask whether reductions in inequality could be
expected to raise or lower emissions, all else being equal. How
would income redistribution affect humanity’s ecological foot-
print? To study that, we decompose the aggregate demand that
we make of the biosphere’s goods and services into the demands
of various income groups. Let i, j denote households. Households
differ according to their incomes yi, yj, and so on, but they differ
also as regards the efficiency with which they convert the bio-
sphere’s goods and services into income. It is conventional to view
inequality in terms of the distribution of household incomes, but
here, we are interested in the distribution of ecological footprints
as well. The latter is reflected in the distribution of the yi/αi. Also, yi
and yi/αi are not the same.
Without loss of generality, let us label households in terms of
increasing income. Therefore, yi < yi+1 for i = 1, . . ., N. There are
strong reasons for thinking that ecological footprint is an in-
creasing function of income, but the matter has been explored
mainly for the case of carbon emissions (49, 50). A question of
interest is whether the functional relation is convex or concave.
Consider an income interval where the function is convex. An
egalitarian redistribution of incomes among households in that
interval would lead to a smaller global ecological footprint, im-
plying that there is no conflict between income equality and
biospheric integrity. However, in a concave interval, the reverse
holds: egalitarian redistributions of incomes would lead to larger
global ecological footprints, and society would face a cruel choice
between income equality and the biosphere’s integrity (15).
There are thus three reasons why we should limit both fertility
and per capita GDP. First, institutions and technology have failed
to meet the problem of climate change, which implies that limit-
ing our global ecological footprint will prove to be even more
difficult unless we are willing to entertain the possibility of limiting
Ny. Second, per capita consumption and population are shaped
by different institutions than the ones that have kept α low.
Addressing these elements of the Impact Equation (Eq. 1) requires
social change and not (certainly not exclusively) policy change.
Moreover, the appropriate levels for bringing about such change
are local and national rather than regional and global, and our
institutions are stronger at the local and national levels than at the
regional and global levels. Recognition that behavior of people
everywhere is in substantial measure socially embedded in ways
that are not always apparent to external analysts should give us
hope that correcting the social externalities associated with con-
sumption and fertility will improve wellbeing directly and not only
by serving to reduce emissions.
Data Availability. All data associated with the manuscript are
provided within the manuscript.
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